The predictive ability of scholars of politics has long been a subject of theoretical debate and methodological development. In theoretical debate, prediction represents a central issue regarding the extent to which the study of politics is scientific. In methodological development, much effort and resource has been devoted to a diverse range of predictive approaches, with varying degrees of success. Expectations that scholars forecast accurately come as much from the policy and media worlds as from the academy. Since the end of the Cold War, scenario development has become prevalent in future-oriented research by area studies scholars. This approach is long due critical reassessment. For all its strengths as a policy tool, scenario development tends towards a bounded methodology, driving the process of anticipating futures along predetermined paths into a standardised range of options, and paying insufficient attention to theoretical and contextual understandings available within the relevant scholarly disciplines.
the distinction between prediction and planning. Scenario analysis too often undermines its own apparent methodological rigour, offering self-contained narrative scenarios which belie claims to present complex interpretations superior to the linear predictions of earlier approaches. The results amount to a static and somewhat formulaic series of comparative case-studies; fictional futures constructed according to the imagined behaviour of different variables. I begin by surveying recent literature on the possibilities and pit-falls of prediction in political science, before turning in more detail to the rise of the scenario.
Future-oriented social science
Charles Taylor, amongst others, has argued that context and interpretation constitute so crucial a part of political action that the notion of abstract models consistently and accurately predicting political behaviour remains problematic, since 'narrowly scientific, reductive approaches to the human world always prove "terribly implausible"' (Rogers, 2008) . Such a stance stems from the position that societies and polities do not operate according to stable calculable rules. Similarly, Bent Flyvbjerg's view is that intuition and context play such a key role for political actors as to render rule-based accounts of actions inadequate. He argues, on this basis, that the key differential between the social and the natural sciences lies in the former's inability to match the latter's predictive ability (Flyvbjerg, 2001) . David Laitin, in a sharp critique of Flyvbjerg's thesis, contends that accurate prediction does not represent a 'necessary component of science', unless 'what is meant is meant by prediction is the ability of scholars in the field to make reasonably good probability estimates of individual behaviour'. This, Laitin argues, social scientists have long been able to do (Laitin, 2005: 120) .
Comparing Political Futures
Broadly speaking, the successes of theoretical modelling are most notable when considering single policy outcomes within a relatively constrained timescale such as, for example, Bueno de Mesquita's lauded prediction of the Iranian succession in the 1980s (Bueno de Mesquita, 1984 ). Moving beyond individual or dyadic cases to the systemic level reduces predictive ability (James, 1995: 187) . Similarly, in articles specifically addressing the question of prediction, strong cases have been made for the broad predictive force of some International Relations theories, such as democratic peace theory (Ray and Russett, 1996: 458-464), power cycle theory (Doran, 1999) , and the geopolitical theory of state power (Collins, 1995) . In these cases, however, the authors have been careful to point out the limitations of prediction. The theories concerned operate at the general rather than the specific level. Returning to the demand from policy-makers for accurate forecasting, Ray and Russett caution against being too ready to make the jump from generalising to strong policy recommendation (1996: 465) . Doran similarly argues that for predictions to be politically useful, they require precision. Citing the Washington adage that 'to be right at the wrong time is to be wrong', he notes that although power cycle theory might confidently predict a shift in the relative power of a state, and provide an explanation as to why this will happen, it cannot say precisely when it will happen.
Neither side in this debate argues that the social sciences have the scientific capability to provide mechanistic predictions in all circumstances. Questions of precision and scale are crucial. Contributors to a symposium on the possibility of prediction in the social sciencessparked, as much of the literature in this field is, by the largely unanticipated collapse of the Soviet system -appeared to represent the range of views for and against as set out above (Collins, 1995; Kuran, 1995; Tilly, 1995) . However, as Edgar Kiser pointed out in his comments on the symposium's findings, apparently opposing positions appear less at odds
with each other when crucial questions of precision and scale are considered (Kiser, 1995: 1611-1612). Randall Collins' argument that theory-based prediction occurs successfully in the social sciences, carried with it the caveat that the range of temporal precision for macropolitical prediction ought to be measured in decades (Collins, 1995 (Collins, : 1552 . In other words, large-scale political processes, such as at the level of countries or international systems, do not readily lend themselves to invariant closed-system modelling since they have a huge number of variables with great complexity in the relations between them (Tilly, 1995 (Tilly, : 1594 .
The broader the field of future vision, the more complex, difficult, and prone to generalisation forecasts become. As many writers on the predictive possibilities of political science point out (Cooper and Layard, 2002: 5; Doran, 1999: 11-13) , the most basic predictions involve linearity and continuity, along the lines of, what is happening today will happen tomorrow, if it is happening more today than it was yesterday, then it is likely to happen even more tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. Forecasts are more reliable when focused on fields of study less prone to short-term instability. All fields of endeavour contain limitations within which to make forecasts, but in some fields harder limitations predominate and in others softer. For example, climate and lack of transport infrastructure represent relatively hard limits on the prospects for resource development in India. We know roughly when the rains will come and how long they will last. We can gauge relatively accurately the length of time necessary to construct a road. Whatever the surrounding circumstances, nothing much will change these facts. The limits on political developments on the other hand are softer. An apparently stable superpower can collapse with rapidity, leading political figures can be assassinated, and so on. In his pioneering methodological overview of predictive studies in the social sciences, Daniel Bell utilised the distinction made
by William Graham Sumner between crescive changes (those which follow largely autonomous processes) and enacted changes (those which stem from the less predictable moves of political actors), arguing that 'sociological analysis is more sure when it deals with crescive changes' such as demographic cycles, and broad societal developments (Bell, 1958: 358) .
A related refinement to our conceptualisation of future-oriented analysis relates to opacity.
Here the oft-maligned Rumsfeldian terminology provides a useful illustration. At a press briefing in 2002, US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, said:
There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -the ones we don't know we don't know.
In the triumvirate of known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns, known unknowns constitute the pivotal category in terms of forecasting. By definition, known knowns bring factual certainty on which we construct forecasts. Similarly, by definition, unknown unknowns can scarcely be factored in, except as a caution that some unforeseeable variable might undermine almost any forecast. Even imaginable wildcards, such as assassinations and earthquakes, might be anticipated in gaming or, as discussed later, scenario planning, but rarely can they be forecast. Known unknowns, however, are those factors which forecasters can identify as important variables, but about which they possess insufficient information. The greater the opacity of a socio-political system, the more known unknowns exist. In an open socio-political system, pollsters publish accurate public opinion surveys, newspapers report political intrigue, and independent statistical agencies reveal socio-economic data. In a more closed or opaque system, the state might Comparing Political Futures control, cover up, or distort such information, making the task of the forecaster more difficult and more reliant on contextual knowledge and intuition. Slavoj Žižek adds to Rumsfeld's triumvirate the missing but logical fourth variant -unknown knowns; in other words, those disavowed beliefs and suppositions which 'we pretend not to know about, even though they form the background of our public values' (Žižek, 2004) .
Although not stated in these terms, the central argument of Ofira Seliktar's book-length answer to the question 'why did so few predict the collapse of the Soviet Union?' is that 'unknown knowns' inhibited scholarly visions of future possibilities for the Soviet Union. In other words, a lack of awareness of, or refusal to acknowledge and question, the dominant paradigms within which forecasts were made, meant that those forecasts contained restricted conceptualisations of possible outcomes, and, in the Soviet case, failed to allow for the possibility of collapse (Seliktar, 2004: 5) .
Returning to the question of the relationship between policy-makers and political scientists when it comes to future-oriented analysis, two further issues arise which affect the nature of that analysis. The first concerns timescales. Broadly speaking, short-term forecasts are more reliable than long-term forecasts, since as the tendencies towards an outcome develop, then analysts more easily see their likely outworking. The trumpeting of particular predictions as remarkable in their foresight should generally be checked against the temporal distance between prediction and event. Roger Boesche's lauding of de Tocqueville's 'astonishing' record of foretelling is undermined a little by the realisation that his 'most dramatic' prediction, of the 1848 revolution in France, was delivered in 1848 (Boesche, 1983: 79) .
The link between confidence in forecasting and distance of projection into the future is not, however, as linear as might be expected when it comes to the impact of the forecast on both the actions of the policy-maker and the reputation of the analyst. Consider medium and long-term forecasting. There is truth in the notion that the further away your prediction, the more confident you can appear, since, as Keynes had it, 'in the long run we are all dead' (Keynes, 1923 : 80), forecasts will be forgotten, and their relevance minimal.
Were I to construct a detailed long-term forecast setting out how China in 2100 will be an Much of this literature is made up of the discipline-specific; methodological outlines and case-studies for businesses undertaking their own scenario-planning exercises (Ringland, 2006) , or detailed analysis of the techniques for developing scenarios in future studies literature (Bishop et al., 2007; Miller, 2007) . My concern here lies not with in-depth assessment of the literature on scenario studies, but specifically with the growth of and The most conventional of approaches to forecasting had long been to simply ask an expert.
However, although they may be related qualities, expertise, wisdom, foresight, and perspective do not always overlap. Expertise may be narrow and focused, overemphasising some factors, underplaying others, and so producing forecasts ill-suited to complex political processes at the country level. One response to the fallibility of the expert in prediction during the Cold War had been the Delphi method, which sought to mitigate the biases and blind-spots of individuals by using a large number of experts in an iterative process. The chief flaw in such a process was its inevitable tendency towards the middle point, with the more radical voices tamed by the majority (Schwartz, 2002: 18) . 
Before considering the use of the scenario approach against its own criteria and in the light of the broader literature on the relationship between political science and forecasting, let us briefly set out its essential elements. The first and, from the point of view of the argument here, the most significant element of the scenario approach is that it is self-avowedly not The common reference within the scenario literature to stories and narratives draws attention to a focus on causal processes and potential turning points. Scenarios commonly identify key drivers, and imagine the impact of a range of uncertainties in relation to them.
In doing so, the standard range of scenarios does not differ much from that established by Kahn in the 1960s: relative continuity, less linear but important variants, and 'the unthinkable' -or 'way out' -scenarios. The standard application of the scenario approach to future political developments involves establishing between three and five scenarios,
with the paths to these outcomes set out on the basis of the actions of or developments in identified key drivers. In terms of its own criteria, the scenario approach clearly has strengths; however, despite its wide use, its appropriateness for scholarly discussion of potential futures has rarely been critiqued. It is not my purpose in this paper to criticise the effective use of scenario planning in the business world (Ringland, 2006) , or its appropriate extension to policy-making (Ogilvy, 2002) . Scenario planning in this sense refers to a structured, facilitated, and normative process which identifies a problem -such as the future strategy of a company or a government -, develops potential scenarios, and then works out appropriate and desirable responses to these alternative futures to be taken by the participants' company, government, and so on. When adopted by area studies scholars and analysts, however, the scenario framework and terminology are employed, but absent a specifically identified problem, provision for facilitated development, or context for delivering a normative response. Stanley Feder argues that scenarios could usefully be employed more in political science, but from the perspective of students sharpening critical thinking; in other respects he likewise favours the use of scenarios in planning (Feder, 2002: 121) .
Any critique of the scenario approach in area studies forecasting must early and squarely consider its central claim, that scenarios are not predictions but rather anticipations of alternative futures. Such a claim would seem to make it difficult to employ the most obvious criticism of future-oriented analysis, namely, that the predictions of the analyst turned out to be wrong. However, it is not unusual for advocates of the scenario approach to treat 'correct' scenarios as successful predictions to be lauded. Indeed, returning to the widespread adoption of scenario planning by scholars in the early 1990s, one of the reasons It is a strange signpost that stands at a crossroads and tells the traveller that all four directions are the way to go. Too many alternatives might as easily be said to obscure as to illuminate the path ahead as the potential variables, rates of change, preferences, and conjectured discontinuities multiply (Miller, 2007: 345) . Much of the merit of the scenario approach lies not so much in its output but in the process of developing scenarios. The standard methodology employed by experts in scenario planning includes several days of workshops, where those with a stake in the identified problem develop the outline scenarios and identify the key drivers, before a smaller group draws up well-researched narratives, which are then brought back to the whole group so that appropriate strategies can be agreed to meet the various feasible futures (Ogilvy, 2002: 176). This process must result in an increased understanding and detailed knowledge of the problem at hand for all involved. However, the use of the scenario approach in published academic work removes many of the advantages of process engagement and delivers instead the product of the process -often undertaken by one or two isolated experts with no direct role in 'solving' the 'problem' -to an external reader. Furthermore, this 'product', Nonetheless, when later returning to reflect on the process and its outcomes, the experts involved came to the conclusion that several faulty 'if-then' causal links had been included, argued that the process of developing scenarios had distorted their views, and rationalised descrepancies between real-world outcomes and scenarios using the same arguments that experts habitually employ in relation to forecasting errors (Sylvan et al., 2004) .
Conclusion
My critique of the scenario approach according to its own criteria has argued that it has particular merit as a structured and facilitated process involving participants engaged in developing policy and strategy. However, readers of articles, reports, and books based around scenarios miss out on this process, where scenario planning's central value lies. As a tool in the hands of scholars and experts then, the scenario approach has a number of difficulties. Its insistence that scenarios are not predictions is undermined by the scenario literature itself, reduces the usefulness of scenarios to policy-makers, and makes poor use of
Comparing Political Futures the expertise available. The scenarios themselves tend towards inflexibility, creating 'silo scenarios' with no interaction between them, and reducing complex causal processes to a limited set of narratives.
The concluding section of this paper considers the scenario approach in the light of forecasting in the social sciences. From the perspective of social scientists engaging with future-oriented research, scenarios formally represent a step back from the idea that prediction is possible. They start from the premise that 'predictive forecasting is almost impossible where the problem forces us to deal with complex interactions of incommensurate driving forces and events' (Schwartz, 2002: 22) . Assuming this to be the case, then they believe that the best we can hope for is to anticipate a range of future possibilities. In the business and policy world in particular, covering the broad range of potential futures in order to at least conceptualise the coming years makes some sense.
However, the scenario approach downplays the achievements of the social science disciplines from both sides of the positivist and interpretivist debate. For the positivist, the insistence that we cannot accurately forecast, and so must treat equally a range of potential outcomes, gives too little weight to broader predictive theories and models, such as democratic peace theory, power cycle theory, and the expected utility model, to name but three approaches whose predictive rigour has been tested in the literature and found to be 
